An Assumption colleague and a friend at Boston College recently
introduced me to the thought of Philippe Bénéton,
a professor of Political Science at the University of Rennes in
France. I read two of his articles and a recent book, De l'Egalité
par Default: Essai sur l'enfermement Moderne (1997). It is not
easy to give a lucid, literal translation of this title. The first
half is "Equality by Default." What this means is not
immediately obvious, but readers are on the right track if they
deduce from the words that the author is going to discuss the
kind of equality that emerges in modern society in the absence
of a compelling alternative. The second half of the title implies
that modernity tends to lock people's minds in a closed-minded
perspective, thereby stifling wonder and thoughtfulness.
Equality by default, explains Bénéton, "is
founded on an idea of man which breaks with all the humanism of
the West. Man is pure indetermination, autonomy without a compass,
liberty without a vocation, he is what he makes of himself."
According to this radical equality, there is no substantial concept
of human nature, no natural or supernatural ends. In other words,
there are no objective norms by which people can take their bearings;
the will is emancipated from all spiritual and moral authority.
All opinions are equal. People have in common the right to have
nothing in common. Unlimited individual autonomy is the natural
consequence of this kind of equality.
The doctrine of equality by default represents a radicalization
of the scope of modern thought, which is "that of the emancipation
of the will." It was only in "late modernity,"
however, that this new version of equality became "the quasiofficial
thought of the Western democracies," especially since the
revolution of mores and moral sentiments in the 1960s. "The
dominant discourse whispers: We are all equal because we are all
masters; we are all masters because to be a human being has no
other meaning than that which each person decides for himself,
because to be a human being has no meaning in itself. The will
is substituted for nature." This way of looking at things
means that a person is free to choose between courage and cowardice,
and even to consider the choice of either quality to be of equal
worth. But, according to this doctrine, one is not free to renounce
one's opinion as the rule of life and seek the truth by looking
to a hero or a saint as a model to imitate. Otherwise stated,
there is no place for the disinterested search for truth either
by reason and the heart, or by deference to a spiritual authority
through faith.
The logic of this new doctrine of equality requires a person to
regard all opinions about serious life questions as equal. To
see things this way is really to see one's own opinions as uncertain
and even insignificant. Why hold on to any perspective or conviction
if it is ultimately arbitrary? Why not embrace the philosophy
of going along to get along? In fact, Bénéton argues,
the adherents of the doctrine of equality by default are prone
to submit to the dominant cultural influences, whatever they may
be. These cultural influences at least "seem" to represent
common opinions in which one can take refuge.
Bénéton's presentation of equality by default is
certainly influenced by his study of Tocqueville's Democracy in
America. In reading Bénéton, I thought of Tocqueville's
chilling statements about the lack of freedom in America. While
discussing the omnipotence of majority opinion, Tocqueville says,
"I know of no country where there prevails, in general, less
independence of mind and true freedom of discussion than in America."
A few paragraphs later he affirms that "there is no freedom
of mind in America." To grasp why Tocqueville makes these
unflattering statements about Americans requires, among other
things, an understanding of his view that the power of the majority
is "not only predominant but irresistible."
Bénéton is making a similar, but ultimately different
point. He believes that today's loss of freedom is not the result
of simple deference to the majority or common opinion, but to
the dominant opinions that prevail in the culture. "In the
admirable work of Tocqueville," writes Bénéton,
"there is something strikingly missing. What is missing is
the avant-garde-the man of modernity who draws inspiration from
the movement of radical emancipation of which he has the vocation
to take the lead. He says to people, 'you are the masters. Believe
me and do what I say.'" The result of this conditioning is
that "there is at bottom only one legitimate opinion."
Like Tocqueville, Bénéton makes his argument about
today's loss of freedom because he wants liberal democracy to
survive and continue to provide its undeniable benefits such as
"the attenuation of prejudices founded on race, nationality
and religion" and the disappearance of authoritarian practices.
He puts forward a notion of "substantial equality" which
is based on what people have in common, namely, a human nature
which has very great dignity. Space doesn't permit an exposition
of his thought on this theme. Suffice it to say that substantial
equality is not an obstacle to independence of mind, but, in fact,
makes thoughtfulness possible.
Bénéton is no utopian hoping for a restoration of
a bygone age, but he wants defenders of democracy to be honest.
Everyone knows, he argues, that some opinions are regarded as
more equal than others, despite the rhetoric about indeterminate
freedom. Instead of just deferring to dominant opinions, there
needs to be genuine, free inquiry-especially in the universities-about
human identity. While citizens can be conditioned to live badly,
no good way of life can be imposed. "Either man has an essence
and is endowed with a vocation," Bénéton says,
"or he is purely indeterminate." The shape of political
and social life depends on the answer to that question.
Students at Assumption are fortunate to have a Department of Political
Science in which faculty members assign primary sources and classic
texts, and in which the various alternatives to the fundamental
questions of human identity and the best regime are discussed
in depth. I am happy to have made the acquaintance of Assumption's
professors of Politics. They have contributed to my education.
J. Brian Benestad
d'Alzon Visiting Professor of Theology